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INTRODUCTION

Twice the Supreme Court has addressed stream of commerce jurisdiction.
And twice it has been unable to articulate a rule governing personal jurisdiction



Associate Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. This article draws on my more detailed
discussion of Justice John Paul Stevens’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in Rodger D. Citron,
The Last Common Law Justice: The Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul
Stevens, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 433 (2011). I wish to thank Julianne Rodriguez and Amanda
Scheier for excellent research assistance, and I also am grateful to Fabio Arcila, Andrea Cohen,
Ellen Deason, Beth Mobley, Dean Lawrence Raful, and Howard Stravitz for their time and
assistance. As always, the errors and omissions are mine.
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in a stream of commerce case. In both Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court1 and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,2 Justice John Paul Stevens
contributed to the Court’s failure to gather more than four votes for any position,
and thereby to do nothing more than decide the case before it.
In 1987, when the Supreme Court decided Asahi, it deadlocked on the
appropriate standard for minimum contacts in a stream of commerce case. Three
Justices joined Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s decision requiring “something
more” than the defendant’s mere awareness of the stream of commerce in order
to establish personal jurisdiction,3 while three Justices agreed with Justice
William Brennan’s less demanding standard that a defendant need only be
“aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State” in order to be
sued there.4 Justice Stevens did not join either of those opinions. Instead, he
wrote his own concurrence, thereby denying a fifth vote to either side.5
Despite its failure to articulate a rule for stream of commerce jurisdiction in
Asahi, the Supreme Court did not revisit the standard for minimum contacts in a
stream of commerce case while Justice Stevens was on the Court. After he
retired in 2010 and was replaced by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court apparently
saw an opportunity to resolve the conflict between the competing approaches set
out by Justices O’Connor and Brennan and granted certiorari in McIntyre.6
Although Stevens had departed, the Court nevertheless was unable to establish
the legal standard for stream of commerce jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court’s
decisions in McIntyre—in which the Justices disagreed not only on the legal
standard for minimum contacts but more fundamentally on the basic principles
governing personal jurisdiction—were even more fragmented than its decisions
in Asahi.7
With the benefit of hindsight, critics of McIntyre may blame Justice Stevens
for creating the need for the Court to decide that case. After all, Stevens could
have determined the legal standard in Asahi by voting with either Justice
Brennan or Justice O’Connor. But Stevens’s singular approach in Asahi was the

1. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
2. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
3. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J.).
4. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
5. See id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his brief concurrence, Justice Stevens
decided that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was not reasonable and declined to make “a
constitutional determination” on the appropriate standard for minimum contacts. Id. As discussed
later in this article, he did, however, discuss the standard for minimum contacts in dicta. Id. at 122;
see infra note 148 and accompanying text.
6. See Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2011) (“When the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, it appeared that its purpose was to
resolve the long-festering Asahi split.” (footnote omitted)). The Court’s order granting certiorari is
found at 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010), and was issued on September 28, 2010, after Justice Stevens had
retired. See Adam Liptak, From Age of Independence to Age of Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2010, at A1 (discussing Justice Stevens’s retirement and legacy).
7. See infra Part IV.A.
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result of nothing more than his common law approach to judging. He generally
decided cases narrowly, focusing on the facts of the case and avoiding
constitutional determinations when possible.8 This approach was consistent with
his common law understanding of the judicial process, in which the law develops
over time on a case-by-case basis.9
In Asahi, Justice Stevens declined to rule on the issue of minimum contacts
in a stream of commerce case.10 However, had he still been on the Court for the
2010–11 Term, Stevens would have had to address minimum contacts in
McIntyre. How would he have voted? I believe that Stevens would have joined
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent and also have written his own brief
dissent. This Article imagines Justice Stevens’s dissent in McIntyre. In order to
engage in this exercise, it is necessary to have a more complete understanding of
his approach to judging—both generally and specifically with respect to personal
jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Article proceeds as follows.
Part II briefly describes Stevens’s common law approach to judging. Part III
provides a detailed account of the Court’s decision in Asahi, the leading stream
of commerce case prior to McIntyre. This discussion draws on the papers of
Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun as well as the published
decisions.11 The papers illuminate an irony of Asahi: although the Court granted
certiorari in Asahi to resolve a conflict in the lower courts with respect to the
standard for minimum contacts in stream of commerce cases, it could reach
agreement only on the application of the fair play and substantial justice factors.
Lastly, Part IV sets out the dissent that I believe Stevens would have written had
he participated in McIntyre.
II. JUSTICE STEVENS: THE SUPREME COURT’S COMMON LAW JUDGE
President Gerald Ford nominated John Paul Stevens to the Supreme Court in
1975.12 In naming a successor to Justice William O. Douglas, the President’s
principal concern was to put forward a well-qualified lawyer.13 Stevens was a
respected federal court of appeals judge on the Seventh Circuit and had
previously distinguished himself as an attorney in private practice in Chicago
and as a law clerk for Justice Wiley Rutledge.14 With no dispute as to his

8. See Rodger D. Citron, The Last Common Law Justice: The Personal Jurisdiction
Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 433 (2011).
9. See id.
10. See infra Part III.D.
11. To my knowledge, no one has yet told the story of Asahi with the benefit of the papers of
Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun at the Library of Congress.
12. Liptak, supra note 6.
13. See id.
14. See Joseph Thai, Stevens, John Paul, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 469, 470 (David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008).
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qualifications and little discussion of his judicial ideology, Stevens was promptly
and unanimously confirmed by the Senate.15
Justice Stevens served from 1975 until 2010.16 In his many decisions and
occasional writings, Stevens generally acted in the manner of the quintessential
common law judge.17 This common law approach was defined by several
related qualities. First, Stevens decided cases narrowly, with an emphasis on the
particular facts of a case.18 Stevens’s commitment to “deliberation focused on
the facts of the particular case” served to restrain “the breadth of [his] judicial
decision[s].”19 Most importantly, Stevens’s approach was consistent with the
common law notion that the law develops over time on a case-by-case basis.20
For a common law judge, courts may and should develop the law by
continuously deciding cases that present new facts and circumstances that
require the application of familiar legal rules, and occasionally, the development
of new legal principles.21
In addition to generally adhering to the common law approach of case-bycase deliberation, Justice Stevens’s judicial approach was characterized by his
understanding of judicial restraint. Although Stevens did not shy away from
exercising judicial power, he nevertheless employed it in moderation, often
deferring to other legal decision-makers.22 For Stevens, the common law
process for the development of constitutional doctrine not only counseled against
overbroad holdings in favor of more gradual development of the law, it also
informed his reluctance to adjudicate constitutional issues when the case could
be decided on other grounds.23
It is important to note that these different qualities—commitment to deciding
cases narrowly with an emphasis on the facts of the case, faith in the
development of the law through the common law approach to deciding cases,

15. See id.; see also Liptak, supra note 6.
16. See Liptak, supra note 6.
17. See William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of
Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1090.
18. Id.; see also Citron, supra note 8, at 436–37.
19. Popkin, supra note 17, at 1091.
20. See id. at 1091, 1094; see also Thai, supra note 14, at 470 (“Stevens’s approach falls
within a common-law tradition of judicial restraint, whereby judges develop the law slowly and
cautiously over the course of many cases.”). See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL REASONING 1–6 (1949) (describing the common law system).
21. See Popkin, supra note 17, at 1094; John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial
Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 180 (1982) (“[O]ur common law heritage and the repeated need to
add new stitches in the open fabric of our statutory and constitutional law foreclose the suggestion
that judges never make law.”).
22. See Thai, supra note 14, at 471 (“This practice of deciding no more than necessary
displays not only Stevens’s judicial restraint and pragmatism, but also exhibits Stevens’s respect for
the coordinate role of the other branches of government in the U.S. constitutional system.”); Citron,
supra note 8, at 438 (citing Popkin, supra note 17, at 1090).
23. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 180 (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 341–56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (noting that the doctrine of judicial restraint “teaches
judges to avoid unnecessary lawmaking”); Popkin, supra note 17, at 1096.
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and belief in judicial restraint—were related to and in fact reinforced each other.
A judicial decision that is narrowly limited to its facts results in the articulation
of a more specific and less general rule. Such a decision also allows for
lawmakers, including courts, to modify or develop the rule depending upon the
facts and circumstances of the next case.24
Justice Stevens applied his common law approach to the Supreme Court’s
personal jurisdiction decisions from 1977 through 1991.25 For example, in the
first decision from this period, the Court substantially restricted the availability
of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner.26 In a scholarly decision
written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that assertions of personal
jurisdiction based upon property should be analyzed according to the fairness
approach set out in International Shoe.27 Although Stevens agreed with the
judgment arrived at by the Court, he declined to join the Court’s opinion because
he believed it was too broad.28 Instead, he wrote a separate concurrence in
which he sought to preserve “quasi in rem jurisdiction where real estate is
involved,”29 and analyzed Delaware’s attempt to exercise jurisdiction based upon
the specific—and unique—aspects of its laws with respect to stock ownership.30
Justice Stevens reasoned that the Due Process Clause protects against
“judgments without notice.” 31 He explained that for nonresident defendants,
notice may come in the form of “fair notice,” defined as fair warning that the
defendant’s activity may subject him to the jurisdiction of the state.32 With
respect to the defendants in Shaffer—who were corporate directors and officers
of Greyhound sued in a derivative suit and haled into Delaware if they owned
Greyhound stock33—Stevens asserted that their purchase of securities on the
open market did not provide fair notice of Delaware’s power to exercise
jurisdiction.34

24. See Popkin, supra note 17, at 1091 (noting that “[j]udicial deference to other institutions
preserves the Court’s time and political capital to implement” the objective of “deliberation about
the facts of a particular case”).
25. From 1977 through 1991, the Supreme Court decided a dozen or so cases addressing
personal jurisdiction doctrine. See Citron, supra note 8 (collecting cases). The Last Common Law
Justice article provides a comprehensive account of Justice Stevens’s written decisions in those
cases. This Article discusses only those cases relevant to understanding how Justice Stevens voted
in Asahi and how, in my view, he would have voted in McIntyre.
26. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
27. Id. at 212.
28. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 218–19.
31. Id. at 217 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324 (1945)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. at 218.
33. Id. at 189–93 (majority opinion).
34. Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice Stevens wrote that the
Delaware sequestration statute created “an unacceptable risk of judgment without notice” because
Delaware was the only state that considered stock to be located in the corporation’s state of
incorporation, even though the actual certificates and owner were not kept within the state. Id.
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Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Shaffer focused on fair notice, a principle
that approximated the concept of minimum contacts set out in International
Shoe. Several years after its decision in Shaffer, the Supreme Court established
that the first part (or prong) of analyzing the constitutionality of any exercise of
personal jurisdiction would be to evaluate the nonresident defendant’s minimum
contacts in the forum state.35 The second part (or prong) would be to analyze
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction was reasonable—more specifically,
whether it comported with principles of “fair play and substantial justice.”36
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Supreme Court upheld the exercise
of personal jurisdiction in a decision that discussed the relationship between
minimum contacts and fair play and substantial justice.37 Justice Stevens
dissented because he believed the exercise of personal jurisdiction was not fair. 38
For Justice Stevens, Burger King involved the intersection of contract law
principles and personal jurisdiction rules.39 Because contract law invites
consideration of the balance of power between the parties, Justice Stevens
believed it authorized the Court to examine the fairness of the transaction
between the parties.40
In Burger King, the Court held that Florida could exercise personal
jurisdiction over a franchisee that operated only in Michigan because of its
extensive dealings with the more powerful franchisor, which was incorporated in
Florida.41 In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that it would not be fair for Burger
King, the franchisor, to be able to hale the franchisee out of its home state where
its business operated.42 His opinion emphasized the disparity in power between
the parties and focused on the facts of that particular case.43

35. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980) (citing
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
36. Id. at 292 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the Court discussed the concepts of “minimum contacts” and “fair play and substantial
justice” in World-Wide Volkswagen, it did not divide the concepts into a two-part (or prong) test
until Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). See id. at 474–77 (citing Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316, 320).
37. Id. at 476–77, 487 (citing World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
38. Id. at 487, 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d
1505, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Burger King, 471 U.S. 462). Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), is another case in which Justice Stevens’s
emphasis on fairness led him to dissent. See id. at 597–605 (Stevens, J., dissenting). I summarize
the Court’s majority opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Carnival Cruise in Citron,
supra note 8, at 459–64. In this Article, however, my discussion of Carnival Cruise is limited to
this footnote because it was decided after Asahi and did not involve the constitutional analysis of
minimum contacts and fair play and substantial justice. In Carnival Cruise, the Court enforced a
forum-selection clause contained in a passenger’s cruise line ticket, despite objections based on
contract and statutory law. See id. (citations omitted).
39. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 489–90 (citing MacShara, 724 F.2d at 1512–13).
41. Id. at 464, 466–68, 482, 487 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 487–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
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Justice Stevens expressed concern about the potential for unfairness in
negotiations between franchisors and franchisees, in which the franchisor
typically is dominant.44 In this discussion, Stevens focused on the relative
strength of the parties rather than the sophistication of Rudzewicz, the
franchisee.45 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan cited Rudzewicz’s
representation by counsel and background as an accountant, as well as the length
of the negotiations between the parties.46 Stevens, however, viewed the
relationship between a national franchisor and a local franchisee as embodying a
“characteristic disparity of bargaining power” demonstrated by the facts that
Rudzewicz had little latitude in negotiations, the final terms were considerably
less favorable than were originally contemplated, and Burger King refused to
make any price concessions.47 As discussed in the next Part, Stevens’s common
law approach to personal jurisdiction doctrine was evident in Asahi,48 the next
personal jurisdiction case decided by the Supreme Court after Burger King.
III. A MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF ASAHI
A. Prelude: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
In 1980, the Supreme Court articulated its most comprehensive decision to
date on specific personal jurisdiction in the context of products liability lawsuits
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.49 The case involved an
automobile accident that occurred in Oklahoma, which is also where the
plaintiffs sued the defendants asserting claims sounding in tort.50 Specifically,
the plaintiffs claimed “that their injuries resulted from [the] defective design and
placement of the [car’s] gas tank and fuel system.”51 The Court found that

44. Id. at 489 (citing MacShara, 724 F.2d at 1512).
45. Id. at 489–90 (citing MacShara, 724 F.2d at 1512).
46. Id. at 485 (majority opinion) (citing MacShara, 724 F.2d at 1514 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting)).
47. Id. at 489–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting MacShara, 724 F.2d at 1512–13) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although Rudzewicz’s franchise was a local business, it nevertheless
had extensive dealings with the Burger King corporation in Florida. See id. at 480–81 (majority
opinion). Therefore, Justice Stevens did not emphasize the lack of fair notice, a principle he set out
in Shaffer. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217–19 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324 (1945)). Instead, his opinion was based on the
unfairness of haling the local franchisee from its home state to the forum state of the more powerful
franchisor. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting MacShara, 724 F.2d
at 1511–13).
48. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
49. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
50. Id. at 288.
51. Id. The plaintiff was the Robinson family, which included the mother Kay, the father
Harry, and their two children who sued through their father. Id. at 288 n.2. The defendants were
“the automobile’s manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft (Audi); its importer,
Volkswagen of America, Inc. (Volkswagen); its regional distributor, . . . World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. (World-Wide); and its retail dealer, . . . Seaway.” Id. at 288.
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neither the retail seller of the car, which was located in New York, nor its
regional distributor, which did business in the Northeast, attempted to conduct
operations or do business in Oklahoma.52 The Court, therefore, held that neither
defendant purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma market and could not be
haled into court in the forum state.53
World-Wide Volkswagen was the Court’s most detailed discussion to date of
the notion of purposeful availment, and it provided an important refinement to
the approach of analyzing personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants set
out in International Shoe.54 With respect to purposeful availment, the Court
stated:
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is not
simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for
its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in
one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been
the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not
exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers in the forum State.55
After World-Wide Volkwagen, lower courts adopted conflicting approaches
to determining whether this “stream of commerce” theory of personal
jurisdiction applied to the manufacturer of a component part of a defective

52. See id. at 288–89, 295.
53. See id. at 297–99.
54. In addition, the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen set out for the first time the
five factors to evaluate to determine whether “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”
have been “offend[ed]” by the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 444 U.S. at 292 (quoting Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the citations
in the relevant paragraph of the Court’s decision demonstrate, the different factors had been set out
in previous cases. See id. World-Wide Volkswagen represents the first case in which the Court
listed all of the factors and presented them as part of the fair play and substantial justice inquiry.
See Citron, supra note 8, at 448 n.81. However, because the Court concluded that the defendants
had not purposefully availed themselves of the forum state, the Court did not analyze the five
factors it set out. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295–99.
55. Id. at 297–98 (citing for analogous support Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)). In Gray, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer of a component part on the basis of the
stream of commerce doctrine. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 766–77; see also Paul D. Carrington & James
A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227, 229 &
n.17 (1967) (citing Gray as one of a “flood of cases in which suppliers of goods were subjected to
the power of the states in which defects in their merchandise took harmful effect”).
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product.56 In 1986, the Court granted certiorari in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court to resolve this conflict.57
B. Asahi at the Supreme Court
1. The Petition for Certiorari
The accident giving rise to Asahi occurred in 1978, when two California
residents were involved in a motorcycle accident on a highway in California.58
One person was killed and the other was severely injured.59 The injured person
filed a products liability lawsuit against a number of defendants in California
state court, asserting that the motorcycle tire, tube, and sealant were defective. 60
One of the defendants was Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company (Cheng
Shin), a tire tube manufacturer in Taiwan that sold its products in the United
States, and specifically in California.61 Subsequently, Cheng Shin filed a crossclaim against its codefendants and a third-party claim against a number of
parties, including Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. (Asahi), a Japanese company
that manufactured the tube valve assembly used in Asahi’s tire tubes.62 Cheng
Shin asserted claims for indemnification.63

56. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (noting different
approaches taken by lower courts). Compare, e.g., Nelson by Carson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d
1120, 1126–27 (7th Cir. 1983) (endorsing stream of commerce theory to allow personal jurisdiction
over purchasing agent and manufacturer), with Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709, 711
(8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (citing Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 578 F. Supp. 530, 533 (N.D. Iowa
1982) (declining to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign car seat manufacturer whose products
were placed into the American stream of commerce by someone other than the seat manufacturer).
Both cases are discussed in Justice Byron White’s draft dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Asahi, which never was published. See 2d Draft Dissent of Justice White at 2–3, Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, No. 85–693 (Feb. 27, 1986) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465) [hereinafter 2d Draft Dissent from
Denial of Certiorari].
57. 475 U.S. 1044 (1986) (granting certiorari).
58. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 105–06.
61. Id. at 106 (“Cheng Shin alleged that approximately 20 percent of its sales in the United
States [were] in California.”).
62. Id.; see also 2d Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 1 (Asahi did
business with Cheng Shin for more than a decade and “[b]etween 1978 and 1982, Asahi sold 1.35
million valve assemblies to Cheng Shin. This accounted for between .44 percent and 1.24 percent
of Asahi’s total income for those years.”).
To be clear, the plaintiff did not name Asahi as a defendant in its original lawsuit. See Asahi,
480 U.S. at 105–06. Eventually the plaintiff settled its claims against all of the defendants named in
its complaint and its lawsuit was dismissed. Id. at 106; see also 2d Draft Dissent from Denial of
Certiorari, supra note 56, at 1–2. See generally Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum
Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729, 783–87 (1988)
(providing a detailed discussion of the litigation in the California courts).
63. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
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Asahi was served with Cheng Shin’s complaint in Japan.64 Asahi moved to
quash service of the summons, essentially arguing that it did not have any
contact with California other than the fact that its tube valves were used in
finished products by other manufacturers who did business and sold their
products in California (as Cheng Shin had done).65 The California Superior
Court denied Asahi’s motion to quash.66 Asahi sought review of the trial court’s
decision in the California Court of Appeals, which issued a writ of mandate
ordering the trial court to grant Asahi’s motion to quash.67 The plaintiffs filed a
petition for hearing to challenge this decision in the California Supreme Court,
which reversed the court of appeals and upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over
Asahi.68
Asahi filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court during the 1985–86
Term.69 Asahi contended that the California Supreme Court’s decision was
inconsistent with World-Wide Volkswagen and conflicted with at least two
federal courts of appeals’ decisions applying the stream of commerce doctrine. 70
Cheng Shin, the respondent and real party in interest, argued that the California
Supreme Court’s decision correctly applied World-Wide Volkswagen and arrived
at a fair and reasonable result.71 Furthermore, Cheng Shin emphasized that
personal jurisdiction determinations were fact-specific and therefore contended
that there was no real conflict to be resolved with respect to the legal analysis
applied in such cases.72

64. 2d Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 2.
65. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106–07.
66. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 545 (Cal. 1985), rev’d, 480
U.S. 102 (1987).
67. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107.
68. See Asahi, 702 P.2d at 545, 553. See also 2d Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari,
supra note 56, at 2; Stravitz, supra note 62, at 785–87.
69. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of California, Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (No. 85-693) [hereinafter Petition for
Certiorari] (on file with author).
70. See id. at 4–6, 15–18 (citations omitted); see also Schultz, Preliminary Memorandum at
5–6, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, No. 85–693 (Jan. 2, 1986) (on file with the Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465) [hereinafter Preliminary
Memorandum] (citing DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3rd Cir. 1981);
Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984)) (“The Cal. Sup. Ct.’s decision is also
inconsistent with the decisions of other courts which have applied the stream of commerce theory to
component part manufacturers.”). This memorandum was written by Andrew Schultz, who was a
law clerk for Justice Byron White during the term when the certiorari petition was filed. See
Andrew G. Schultz, RODEY LAW, http://www.rodey.com/pg_attorney.html?a=aschultz (last visited
Apr. 4, 2012).
71. See Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of
California at 5–13, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (No. 85-693)
[hereinafter Respondent’s Opposition] (on file with author); Preliminary Memorandum, supra note
70, at 6–7.
72. See Respondent’s Opposition, supra note 71, at 15–18; Preliminary Memorandum, supra
note 70, at 6–7.
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The Court apparently considered the petition for certiorari in conference on
January 17, 1986.73 A preliminary memorandum from a law clerk—what is
known as a “cert. pool memo” 74—noted a “clear conflict among the federal
[circuit] courts of appeal” with respect to how World-Wide Volkswagen applied
to manufacturers of component parts such as Asahi and recommended that the
Court grant the petition.75 Justice Harry Blackmun’s law clerk recommended
that Blackmun vote against granting certiorari. At the bottom and on the back of
the last page of the preliminary memorandum, there is a handwritten note
analyzing the relevant authorities that concluded: “Since Cal. Sct’s opinion is in
accord with the majority view (and to me seems correct) I think cert should be
denied. The conflicting cases are not precisely the same. And I agree with resp.
that in this area, the questions are very factually based.”76
2. The Initial Conference Vote
Neither the Marshall nor the Blackmun papers show exactly how each
Justice voted at the conference, but it appears that fewer than four Justices
initially voted to grant certiorari. On February 25, Justice Byron White
circulated a draft dissent from the denial of certiorari, and two days later Justice
Lewis Powell indicated that he would join White’s dissent.77 In his draft dissent,
White quoted the critical passage from World-Wide Volkswagen set out above
and noted that “[s]ince that observation, a clear conflict among the lower courts
has developed concerning how this ‘stream of commerce’ theory of personal
jurisdiction is to be applied to a component part manufacturer.”78 Therefore, he
recommended granting the petition.79 Subsequently, on March 3, 1986, the
Court granted certiorari.80
The parties briefed the case81 and oral argument was held on November 5,
1986.82 Two days later, the Justices met in conference to vote.83 Justice

73. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 70, at 1.
74. See Nancy C. Staudt, Agenda Setting in Supreme Court Tax Cases: Lessons from the
Blackmun Papers, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 889, 894 (2004).
75. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 70, at 8–9.
76. Id. at 9–add. The handwritten note is signed “HM” on January 12, 1986. Id. HM was
Helane Morrison, one of Justice Blackmun’s law clerks for the 1985–86 Term. Corporate, HALL
CAPITAL (Feb. 17, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.hallcapital.com/team/corporate/helane-l-mor
rison.php.
77. See 2d Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 1.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id. at 4.
80. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 475 U.S. 1044 (1986) (granting certiorari).
81. In its opening merits brief, Asahi argued that under World-Wide Volkswagen,
“application of the ‘stream of commerce’ theory” did not authorize “California to assert jurisdiction
over” the Japanese company. Petitioner’s Brief at 7, Asahi, 480 U.S. 102 (No. 85-693), 1986 WL
727585 at *7. In addition, Asahi contended that “[e]ven if sufficient minimum contacts existed,”
id., “[t]he assertion of . . . jurisdiction [did] not accord Asahi fair play and substantial justice” given
“the burden upon the defendant, the opportunity of the Far Eastern plaintiff to sue in its own

654

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63: 643

Blackmun’s papers include a two-page chart for the case that indicates the
position of each Justice at the conference.84 The chart lists the name of each
Justice and in small handwriting includes brief notes about each Justice’s
views.85 Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Powell,
O’Connor, and Antonin Scalia apparently voted to reverse the California
Supreme Court.86 Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens appear to have voted to
affirm.87 And Justice William Brennan apparently wanted to dismiss the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted based upon the notation of “DIG” next to his
name on the chart.88
3. Justice O’Connor’s First Draft of the Opinion of the Court
Justice O’Connor was assigned to write the Opinion of the Court and
circulated a first draft on December 15, 1986.89 This draft had the same structure

hemisphere, and the inappropriateness of applying California law or choosing a California court to
administer Far Eastern law,” id. at 8.
In its brief, respondent Cheng Shin contended that “Asahi’s conduct satisfies minimum contact
requirements” because the company “had knowledge that Cheng Shin was incorporating Asahi’s
valve into its own product and selling the product to California.” Respondent’s Brief at 5, Asahi,
480 U.S. 102 (No. 85-693), 1986 WL 727589 at *5. Noting that “[t]wenty percent of the Cheng
Shin tire valves sold in the United States were destined for California,” and that “[o]ver a five year
period, Asahi sold 1.35 million valves to Cheng Shin,” Cheng Shin argued that Asahi had availed
itself of the state of California because “Asahi knowingly benefited economically from the
systematic and continued sales of its component parts in California” by Cheng Shin and other
manufacturers who marketed their products “worldwide.” Id.
82. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT
COLLEGE OF LAW (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_693
(audio of oral argument).
83. See Chart of Justices, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, No. 85-693 (on file with
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465) [hereinafter
Chart].
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. There is a minus sign (“-”) next to the names of these five justices. According to
a subsequent memo written by his law clerk, Blackmun believed that the California Supreme Court
should be reversed because “jurisdiction [did] not comport with ‘fair play and substantial
justice’”—the second prong of the Court’s analysis of personal jurisdiction set out in World-Wide
Volkswagen. Memorandum from Ellen, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of U.S., to Justice Blackmun,
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. 1 (Jan. 15, 1987) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465). The memorandum was written by
Ellen Deason, one of Justice Blackmun’s law clerks for the 1986–87 Term. Ellen E. Deason, THE
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY (Feb. 17, 2012 5:36 PM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/bios.
php?ID=17.
87. See Chart, supra note 83, at 1–2 (showing a plus sign “+” next to the names of these three
Justices).
88. See id. at 1.
89. See 1st Draft Opinion of the Court at 1, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, No.
85-693 (Dec. 15, 1986) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry
A. Blackmun, Box 465) [hereinafter Justice O’Connor 1st Draft].
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and contained most of the same text as her final opinion. In order to highlight
the changes made before the decision was finalized, I briefly summarize the draft
here.
Justice O’Connor began with a paragraph setting out the question presented:
This case presents the question whether the mere awareness on the
part of an foreign defendant that the components it manufactured, sold
and delivered outside the United States would reach the forum state in
the stream of commerce . . . such that the exercise of jurisdiction “does
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”90
Part I of the opinion set out the facts of the motorcycle accident and the
procedural history of the litigation in the California courts.91
Part II of the draft opinion had two parts. In Part II-A, Justice O’Connor
provided the minimum contacts analysis, which concluded that “something more
than that the defendant was aware of its product’s entry into the forum state
through the stream of commerce” was required “in order for the state to exert
jurisdiction over the defendant.” 92 According to O’Connor, the facts established
that Asahi did not attempt to purposefully avail itself of the California market,
and, therefore, California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the company
exceeded the limits of due process.93
Although Justice O’Connor held that Asahi did not have sufficient minimum
contacts with California (and could have concluded her analysis with this
holding94), she nevertheless proceeded to analyze the fair play and substantial
justice factors set out in World-Wide Volkswagen.95 Her discussion “of the
reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction” included a lengthy quotation from
that case that began: “[T]he burden on the defendant, while always a primary
concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant
factors . . . .”96 O’Connor then analyzed the factors, noting the “severe” burden

90. Id. Justice O’Connor included the citation “International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463” at the end of this sentence. Id.
In her published decision, she changed “an” to “a” and added the year—(1940)—to the Milliken v.
Meyer citation, but otherwise did not make any other changes to this paragraph. Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987).
91. Justice O’Connor 1st Draft, supra note 89, at 1–4.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Id. at 8–9. The text of this discussion in the first draft is identical to the discussion in her
published decision. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112–13.
94. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 295 (1980)
(articulating, but not applying, the fair play and substantial justice factors after concluding that the
defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the forum state).
95. Justice O’Connor 1st Draft, supra note 89, at 9–12 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 292).
96. Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed below, O’Connor revised this text after
corresponding with Justice Brennan about the draft opinion.
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on Asahi, the “slight” interests “of the plaintiff and the forum in California’s
assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi,” and the need “to consider the procedural
and substantive policies of other nations” when evaluating “the interests of the
‘several States’ . . . in the efficient judicial resolution of the dispute and the
advancement of substantive policies.”97 She concluded that California’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction over Asahi was unreasonable and unfair.98
With respect to the forum state’s interest in the dispute, Justice O’Connor
wrote:
With the departure of California resident Zurcher from the
litigation, California’s legitimate interests in the dispute have
considerably diminished. The Supreme Court of the State of California
argued that the State had an interest in “protecting its consumers by
ensuring that foreign manufacturers comply with the state’s safety
standards.” The state supreme court’s definition of California’s interest,
however, was overly broad. The dispute between Cheng Shin and Asahi
[was] primarily about indemnification rather than safety standards.99
In the rest of the paragraph, Justice O’Connor noted that it was not clear
whether California law would govern an indemnification dispute between two
foreign companies over the foreign sale and shipment of goods.100 Finally, she
acknowledged that there was a deterrent value associated with the prospect of
being sued in California, but nevertheless concluded that “similar [deterrent]
pressures will be placed on Asahi by the purchasers of its components as long as
those who use Asahi components in their final products, and sell those products
in California, are subject to the application of California tort law.”101
4. Justice Stevens’s Draft Concurrence
On December 19, 1986, four days after Justice O’Connor circulated her first
draft to the Court, Justice Stevens circulated the first draft of his decision.102 In a

97. Id. at 10–11; see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114–15.
98. Justice O’Connor 1st Draft, supra note 89, at 12 (“Considering the international context,
the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum state,
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would be
unreasonable and unfair.”); see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (showing identical text, except “state”
was changed to “State” in the published decision).
99. Justice O’Connor 1st Draft, supra note 89, at 10–11 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 553 (Cal. 1985), rev’d, 480 U.S. 102).
100. Id. at 11 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–22 (1985); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)).
101. Id. See also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
102. 1st Draft Opinion of Justice Stevens at 1, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, No.
85-693 (Dec. 19, 1986) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry
A. Blackmun, Box 465).
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brief opinion, Stevens concurred in the judgment but declined to join Part II-A of
O’Connor’s decision on minimum contacts in a stream of commerce case.103 He
explained that it was not “necessary” for the Court to do “[a]n examination of
minimum contacts” because analysis of “the factors set forth in World-Wide
Volkswagen” established that “California’s exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi in
this case would be ‘unreasonable and unfair.’”104
Then, in dicta, Justice Stevens argued that Justice O’Connor had misapplied
her more demanding test for purposeful availment to the facts.105 He explained
that “[o]ver the course of its dealings with Cheng Shin, Asahi ha[d] arguably
engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than ‘[t]he placement of a product into
the stream of commerce, without more.’”106 Stevens concluded, “In most
circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing
that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period several
years would constitute ‘purposeful availment’ even though the item delivered to
the forum State was a standard product marketed throughout the world.” 107
5. The Initial Votes of Justices Scalia and Blackmun
On the same day, Justice Scalia informed Justice O’Connor that he too
would concur in her decision.108 He began his memorandum by noting that he
agreed with Justice Stevens “that we should not decide more issues than are
needed per case.”109 However, he continued, “it seems to me preferable to
decide the point addressed in Part II-A of your opinion, rather than the point
John prefers, addressed in Part II-B.”110 Scalia explained that Part II-A, on
minimum contacts, “is no more than an application of Worldwide Volkswagon
[sic],” while Part II-B, on fair play and substantial justice, “elevates to an
alternate holding the dicta in Burger King, Keeton, and Calder—dicta that I am
not sure I agree with.”111

103. See id. The text of Justice Stevens’s first draft is virtually identical to the text of his
published decision except for stylistic edits. Compare id. at 1–2, with Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121–22
(Stevens, J., concurring).
104. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
105. Id. at 122.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Dec. 19, 1986) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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On December 30, 1986, Justice Blackmun informed Justice O’Connor that
he would not join Part II-A of her opinion.112 He noted that, “We seem to be
somewhat all over the lot in this case. I am about where John and Byron
are . . . [and] would decide the case on the basis of fairness rather than on the
minimum contacts issue.”113 His memorandum concluded: “For now, I shall
wait to see what Bill Brennan writes.”114
6. Justice Brennan’s First Draft
Justice Brennan weighed in about two weeks later on January 15, 1987.115
In his first draft, he concurred in the judgment and wrote on both parts of the
Court’s analysis.116 In Part I, Brennan argued for a less demanding standard for
minimum contacts in a stream of commerce case.117 In his view, “As long as a
participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the
forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”118
Brennan explained that this standard followed from the Court’s decision in
World-Wide Volkswagen.119 He then concluded that “the facts found by the
California Supreme Court support its finding of minimum contacts.”120
In Part II of his first draft, Justice Brennan addressed the fair play and
substantial justice factors.121 Initially, he disagreed with Justice O’Connor’s
assertion that when evaluating those factors “the burden on the defendant must
be the primary concern,”122 and reiterated his view, set out in his World-Wide
Volkswagen dissent, that “the ‘interests of the forum State and other

112. Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Dec. 30, 1986) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 1st Draft Opinion of Justice Brennan at 1, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, No.
85-693 (Jan. 15, 1987) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry
A. Blackmun, Box 465) [hereinafter Brennan 1st Draft].
116. See id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
117. See id. at 1–2.
118. Id. at 2. See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting the same).
119. See Brennan 1st Draft, supra note 115, at 2–5. See also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117–20
(Brennan, J., concurring) (same). The text of Part I of Brennan’s first draft is essentially the same
as the text of his final published decision.
120. Brennan 1st Draft, supra note 115, at 5. “I cannot join the Court’s determination that
Asahi’s regular and extensive sales of component parts to a manufacturer it knew was making
regular sales of the final product in California is insufficient to establish minimum contacts with
California.” Id. at 6. See also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (same).
121. Brennan 1st Draft, supra note 115, at 6 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
122. Id. at 6 (quoting Justice O’Connor 1st Draft, supra note 89, at 1) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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parties . . . are entitled to as much weight as are the interests of the
defendant.’”123
Justice Brennan then weighed the various factors.124 He did not discuss—
and therefore did not dispute—Justice O’Connor’s conclusion that the burden on
Asahi, the defendant, was severe. Brennan observed that “the interests of the
State and of the plaintiff are modest.”125 As to the former, he explained that
although “[t]he State has an interest in apportioning the liability between foreign
manufacturers,” that interest was relevant only if California law applied—and he
believed that “it is uncertain whether it would.”126 Additionally, Brennan noted
that the “interests of the State must also be viewed in light of the considerations
of international comity that the Court identifies.”127 Because he agreed with
O’Connor’s decision with respect to the fair play and substantial justice factors,
Brennan concurred in the judgment of the Court.128
7. Justices Brennan and O’Connor Agree to Agree on Fair Play and
Substantial Justice
On the same day that Justice Brennan circulated his first draft, Justice
O’Connor sent a brief response in which she stated, “It appears that we are not
far apart with regard to” fair play and substantial justice.129 “Indeed,” she
continued, “the only major point of departure appears to be your disagreement
with my reference to the notation in World-Wide Volkswagen that the burden on
the defendant is a primary concern in determining the reasonableness of an
assertion of jurisdiction.”130
Justice O’Connor insisted—correctly—that her draft accurately reflected the
Court’s views, but nevertheless proposed a compromise: “I am willing to delete
the quoted sentence if you would be able to concur with that portion of the
opinion.”131 O’Connor elaborated that, instead of including the direct quotation
from World-Wide Volkswagen with the language to which Brennan objected, she

123. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 (1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
124. See id. at 6–7.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Id. at 6–7. Justice Brennan elaborated: “California’s contacts with the parties and much
of the underlying transaction are attenuated: the plaintiff is not a California resident; the parties’
business relationship was formed outside the United States; and the valves were shipped from Japan
to Taiwan.” Id. at 7 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he uncertainty about the choice-of-law is
compounded by the scanty record in this case, which does not disclose the terms of any contract that
may have existed between Asahi and Cheng Shin.” Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 7–8.
129. Memorandum from Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Jan. 15, 1987) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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could instead insert a paragraph summarizing the fair play and substantial justice
factors with a citation to the case.132 In addition, she offered to delete a sentence
in her draft that reiterated the point that “the burden on the defendant is a
primary concern in determining the reasonableness of an assertion of
jurisdiction.” 133
Justice Brennan replied to Justice O’Connor on the same day.134 He wrote:
Dear Sandra,
You’re right—we are not far apart, and your proposed changes
would indeed go a great distance toward meeting my concerns. There is
one remaining loose end, however. Your opinion makes two references
to the fact that the original California plaintiff has settled with Cheng
Shin . . . . As I explain in footnote 6 of my draft, I would not place any
weight on this fact, because the State has an interest in avoiding the
incentives such a consideration would create. If, in addition to the
change you have proposed, you could also delete these two references,
then I would simply drop my Part II and join your Part II-B.135
Justice O’Connor promptly responded to Justice Brennan’s note the next day
and stated that she would “recirculate a draft” that would “make it possible” for
him to “join Part II-B” of her decision.136 Nearly a week later, after he received
O’Connor’s revised draft, Brennan agreed to join Part II-B of her decision

132. Id.
133. Id. at 1–2. Justice O’Connor’s note to Justice Brennan prompted Justice Blackmun’s law
clerk to draft a brief memorandum for him which reported that “it looks as if JUSTICE BRENNAN
and JUSTICE O’CONNOR will be able to iron out their differences.” Memorandum from Ellen,
Law Clerk, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the
U.S. 1 (Jan. 15, 1987) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry
A. Blackmun, Box 465). This memorandum is a separate memo from the one discussed supra in
Part II.B.2. See supra note 86.
134. Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Jan. 15, 1987) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465).
135. Id.
136. Memorandum from Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Jan. 16, 1987) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465). Given the
revisions resulting from the correspondence between Justice O’Connor and Justice Brennan, Justice
Blackmun’s law clerk recommended that Blackmun join Brennan’s opinion and Parts I and II-B of
O’Connor’s opinion, explaining: “That will put you on record finding minimum contacts and
approving the stream of commerce test and yet, finding no jurisdiction in this case because of the
need for ‘fair play.’ I see no need for you to write anything separately. Enough has been said in
this case!” Memorandum from Ellen, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Harry A.
Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Jan. 20, 1987) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465).
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without writing separately on fair play and substantial justice.137 After agreeing
to join this part of O’Connor’s decision, Brennan had to revise his draft and
circulate it accordingly.138 The Justices finished their work on the case over the
next month.
C. A Brief Summary of the Justices’ Final Decisions in Asahi
The final decisions in Asahi were published on February 24, 1987.139 To
briefly summarize: the question in Asahi was whether the Cheng Shin Rubber
Industrial Company, which manufactured tire tubes in Taiwan, could hale the
Asahi Metal Industry Company, which manufactured tire tube valve assemblies
in Japan, into California State Court after Cheng Shin was sued by a California
resident injured in a motorcycle accident on a California highway. 140
The Supreme Court divided on the standard to be applied when evaluating
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a component part manufacturer
pursuant to the stream of commerce theory. Three Justices joined Part II-A of
Justice O’Connor’s opinion, in which she stated that “[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”141 In O’Connor’s
view, Asahi did not have sufficient “minimum contacts” with California.142
In his concurrence, which also secured four votes, Justice Brennan
advocated a less restrictive approach to establishing stream of commerce
jurisdiction.143 In his view, purposeful availment was satisfied “[a]s long as a
participant in [the] process [from manufacture to distribution to retail sale] is
aware that the product is being marketed in the forum State.”144 Therefore,
Brennan concluded that the California Supreme Court correctly found that Asahi
had minimum contacts with the state.145
Justice Stevens declined to join either Part II-A of O’Connor’s opinion on
minimum contacts or Justice Brennan’s concurrence. He wrote a brief decision
concurring with Parts I and II-B, and concurring in the judgment.146 Stevens
explained that it was not “necessary” for the Court to do “[a]n examination of
minimum contacts” because analysis of “the factors set forth in World-Wide
Volkswagen” established that “California’s exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi in

137. See Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the
U.S., to Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Jan. 21, 1987) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465).
138. Id.
139. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
140. See id. at 105–06.
141. Id. at 105, 112 (O’Connor, J.).
142. Id. at 116.
143. See id. at 116–17 (Brennan, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 117.
145. Id. at 121.
146. Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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this case would be ‘unreasonable and unfair.’”147 Then, in dicta, Stevens argued
that O’Connor had misapplied her more demanding test for purposeful availment
to the facts because “[o]ver the course of its dealings with Cheng Shin, Asahi has
arguably engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than ‘[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more.’”148
Despite this disagreement over the minimum contacts standard, every
Justice, except Justice Antonin Scalia, concluded that California’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Asahi would violate principles of fair play and
substantial justice.149 And because Scalia agreed with Justice O’Connor’s
holding with respect to minimum contacts and her conclusion,150 Asahi prevailed
in a unanimous judgment.
On February 25, 1987, the day after the Court issued its decision in Asahi,
Justice O’Connor sent a memorandum to the conference discussing a case that
had been held pending the disposition of Asahi.151 The case, Behning v.
Camelback Ski Corp.,152 involved Maryland’s assertion of personal jurisdiction
over the Pennsylvania operator of a ski resort.153 As the case percolated through
the Maryland courts, there was disagreement over whether the defendant could
be sued in Maryland; Maryland’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, had
concluded that the ski operator had not purposefully availed itself of
Maryland.154
Justice O’Connor recommended that the Court grant the petition for
certiorari, vacate the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals and remand for
reconsideration in light of Asahi.155 She explained that this disposition of
Behning was appropriate given that the “language in Part II A of the Asahi
opinion might be read to support a finding of personal jurisdiction in this
case . . . and that a majority of the Court apparently supports a more expansive

147. Id. at 121 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
148. Id. at 122 (second alteration in original). Justice Stevens concluded that “[i]n most
circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing that results in
deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years would constitute ‘purposeful
availment’ even though the item delivered to the forum State was a standard product marketed
throughout the world.” Id.
149. See id. at 105, 116 (majority opinion).
150. See id. at 105.
151. Memorandum from Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
the Justices’ Conference (Feb. 25, 1987) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 465) [hereinafter O’Connor Conference Memo].
152. 484 A.2d 646 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984), rev’d, 513 A.2d 874, 882 (Md. 1986), cert.
granted—vacated and remanded, 480 U.S. 901 (1987). This case was No. 86-839 in the Supreme
Court. See Behning, 480 U.S. at 901.
153. See Behning, 484 A.2d at 648–49.
154. See Behning, 513 A.2d at 882 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980)); see also O’Connor Conference Memo, supra note 151 (noting the procedural
history of Behning and suggesting it should be remanded for reconsideration in light of the recent
Asahi holding).
155. See O’Connor Conference Memo, supra note 151.
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test for minimum contacts than was presented in Part II A.”156 This discussion
of the Court’s opinion in Asahi is notable because it shows that O’Connor
understood Justice Stevens’s concurrence as a rejection of her restrictive
approach to minimum contacts, meaning that her higher standard for minimum
contacts received only four votes.
D. Justice Stevens’s Concurrence in Asahi as a Common Law Decision
Justice Stevens’s brief concurrence in Asahi was a paradigmatic common
law decision.157 His opinion was narrow and limited to the facts of the case
before the Court.158 As both he and Justice Brennan recognized, Asahi presented
the “rare case[]” in which the fair play and substantial justice analysis
outweighed the defendant’s minimum contacts and defeated the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.159 The difference between Stevens and Brennan was that
the former found it unnecessary to make a determination with respect to
minimum contacts160 while Brennan—who consistently championed an
expansive approach to personal jurisdiction161—nevertheless wrote separately on
minimum contacts and articulated a competing rule to Justice O’Connor’s more
demanding “something more” requirement for minimum contacts in a stream of
commerce case.162
Although Justice Stevens saw no reason to establish a test for minimum
contacts in Asahi, he nevertheless responded to Justice O’Connor’s discussion in
dicta.163 As noted above, Stevens suggested that even under O’Connor’s more
restrictive rule for minimum contacts, Asahi could be found to have purposefully
availed itself of the forum state.164 This discussion was limited to the facts
specific to Asahi’s conduct and is the clearest example of his common law
approach to the issue of personal jurisdiction.165 The discussion shows that he
did not attempt to articulate a more general rule with respect to minimum
contacts, but instead, limited his analysis to the facts of the case before the
Court.166 The next personal jurisdiction case, Stevens implied, would be decided

156. Id.
157. See Citron, supra note 8, at 436.
158. See id.
159. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewizc, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985)); id. at 121–22
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78).
160. See id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring).
161. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (advocating a broad test for minimum contacts
based on the extent to which the defendant’s activities were “purposefully directed” toward the
forum state (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774–75 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
162. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
163. See Citron, supra note 8, at 452.
164. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
165. See Citron, supra note 8, at 436, 452–53.
166. See id. at 448.
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based upon the facts specific to that case—an approach entirely consistent with
the view that a legal doctrine, such as personal jurisdiction, develops one case at
a time.167
Furthermore, as Justice Stevens noted, his narrow decision in Asahi made
solely on the basis of fair play and substantial justice was appropriate because he
believed the Court should avoid making a fact specific constitutional
determination with respect to minimum contacts.168 Asahi presented a case in
which Stevens believed the better course was to follow Justice Brandeis’s
concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority and “avoid
unnecessary lawmaking.”169
Finally, Justice Stevens arrived at a fair result in Asahi. As noted previously
in the discussion of Burger King and Carnival Cruise, fairness concerns
informed Stevens’s personal jurisdiction decisions.170 In Asahi, Stevens joined
Part II-B—Justice O’Connor’s holding that California’s exercise of jurisdiction
over Asahi violated principles of fair play and substantial justice.171 He did not
discuss fairness further. That may be because Asahi and Cheng Shin were
foreign corporations that stood on equal footing in their dealings, and therefore,
Asahi did not present a case in which a more powerful and sophisticated party
took advantage of a less sophisticated party. Furthermore, because Asahi and
Cheng Shin were foreign parties, there was nothing unfair about denying Cheng
Shin the ability to sue Asahi in a California court. Although concern for a fair
result may not have animated his concurrence, Stevens nevertheless reached a
fair result based on the facts of the case.
IV. IMAGINING JUSTICE STEVENS’S DISSENT IN MCINTYRE
A. The Opinions in McIntyre
As noted in the preceding part, Justice Stevens declined to address the
standard for minimum contacts in Asahi.172 Had he still been on the Court for
the 2010–11 Term when McIntyre was argued and decided, Stevens would have
been required to make a minimum contacts determination. McIntyre involved a
claim by a man in New Jersey who injured himself there while using a metal
shearing machine manufactured by a British company.173 The issue specifically
raised by the case was whether the British manufacturer had minimum contacts
in—or more precisely, whether it had availed itself of—the state of New Jersey

167. See id. at 436–37 (citing Popkin, supra note 17).
168. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
169. Stevens, supra note 21, at 180 (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
341–56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 44.
171. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (majority opinion); id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 146–148.
173. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality opinion).
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when the company sold its machines in the United States through a U.S.
distributor and sold no more than four of its machines in New Jersey.174 The
case presented a straightforward question about the exercise of stream of
commerce jurisdiction.
As the three opinions in McIntyre demonstrate, Justice Stevens would have
been able to choose from three different approaches. He could have provided
Justice Anthony Kennedy with a fifth vote by now adopting Justice O’Connor’s
something more standard for stream of commerce jurisdiction.175 Given
Stevens’s refusal to join O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi with respect to minimum
contacts more than two decades ago, there is no reason to believe that he would
have joined Kennedy’s plurality decision in McIntyre.
What about the brief concurring opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer and
joined by Justice Samuel Alito?176 Breyer wrote a very narrow decision that
hewed closely to the facts of McIntyre and declined to articulate a new rule. 177
According to Breyer, New Jersey did not have personal jurisdiction over the
British manufacturer because “[n]one of [the Court’s] precedents finds that a
single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated
here, [primarily the use of an independent distributor in the United States,] is
sufficient” to support the exercise of jurisdiction.178 Although Breyer’s
concurrence seems to resemble an opinion by Stevens in its narrow approach and
reluctance to create a new rule, I believe that Breyer’s opinion rests upon a
misreading of the Court’s prior precedents. Therefore, I believe that Stevens
would not have joined Breyer’s concurrence.
This leaves Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which was joined by two other
Justices, including Justice Stevens’s replacement, Justice Elena Kagan.179
Ginsburg’s dissent is the longest of the three opinions and contains a detailed
discussion of the facts, a cogent summary of the governing jurisdictional rules
and cases, and a straightforward application of those rules to the facts. I believe
that with his common law approach to deciding cases, Stevens would have
joined this dissent.
B. How Justice Stevens Would Have Reached His Decision in McIntyre
In order to arrive at a decision in McIntyre, I believe that Justice Stevens
would have applied the factors he set out in his Asahi concurrence. Whether J.
McIntyre Machinery’s conduct rose “to the level of purposeful availment” in
New Jersey would require “a constitutional determination that is affected by the
volume, the value, and the hazardous character of” the machine(s) sold by the

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id.
See id. at 2788–89 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112).
See id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id.
Id. at 2791–92.
See id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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company.180 The quotation in the preceding sentence replaces the term
“components” from Asahi with the phrase “machine(s) sold by the company.”
That is because J. McIntyre was not selling components but rather a finished
product, albeit through the use of a distributor.181 This difference from Asahi
supports the exercise of jurisdiction because J. McIntyre had control over
whether to attempt to sell, or not sell, its products in New Jersey. 182
Furthermore, although the volume of sales to New Jersey was low, the machines
had a high value and certainly were hazardous.183 A single machine cost about
$25,000 and could inflict a serious injury on a user if it malfunctioned.184 Even
if there was just a single sale of the metal shearing machine in New Jersey,
Justice Stevens would have concluded that this sale would support the exercise
of specific jurisdiction.
This argument is supported by Justices Stevens’s concurrence in Shaffer, in
which he concluded that an individual’s purchase of stock of a U.S. company on
the open market did not provide “fair notice” to individuals that they were
availing themselves of the state of the company’s incorporation.185 The facts in
McIntyre with respect to fair notice were very different. J. McIntyre Machinery
was a manufacturer with the power and authority to decide how—and where—to
sell its products in the United States.186 Furthermore, although the company had
only limited sales in New Jersey, it nevertheless attempted to sell its machines
“anywhere in the United States,” including the state of New Jersey.187 Justice
Stevens, therefore, would likely have argued that the company’s sales and
marketing efforts gave it fair notice that it could be sued in a state where its
machine injured someone.188

180. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 122 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
181. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
182. See id. (“[T]he U.S. distributor ‘structured [its] advertising and sales efforts in
accordance with’ J. McIntyre’s ‘direction and guidance whenever possible.’” (quoting Nicastro v.
McIntyre Mach. Am., 987 A.2d 575, 579 (2010))).
183. See id. (noting that “no more than four machines . . . ended up in New Jersey”); id. at
2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The machine that injured Nicastro . . . sold in the United States for
$24,900 in 1995, and features a ‘massive cutting capacity.’” (citation omitted)).
184. See id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
185. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
186. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 2796.
188. Justice Stevens joined the Court’s opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.
444 U.S. 286, 286 (1980). It would have been consistent for him to vote with the majority in
World-Wide Volkswagen and dissent in McIntyre. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held that
the regional distributor and retail seller of the automobile did not avail themselves of Oklahoma,
where the accident occurred and the plaintiffs brought suit. Id. at 295. The Court did not address
whether there was personal jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer, which did not object to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 288 n.3. Furthermore, as Justice Ginsburg noted, “the
Court said in World-Wide Volkswagen that, when a manufacturer or distributor aims to sell its
product to customers in several States, it is reasonable ‘to subject it to suit in [any] of those States if
its allegedly defective [product] has there been the source of the injury.’” J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at
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Finally, Justice Stevens’s dissents in Burger King and Carnival Cruise
support the conclusion that he would have dissented in McIntyre. In those cases,
Stevens dissented because of his concern that the exercise of jurisdiction—
upheld by the Court in each case—would be unfair.189 In both Burger King and
Carnival Cruise, an individual was required to litigate in an inconvenient forum
chosen by its more powerful corporate adversary.190 In each case, Stevens’s
attack on jurisdiction was bolstered by his reliance on contract law doctrine that
enabled him to consider the relative strength and sophistication of the parties to
the dispute.191 Although McIntyre was not a contract case, I nevertheless believe
that Stevens’s sensitivity to arriving at a fair result would have led him to uphold
New Jersey’s exercise of jurisdiction over the British manufacturer because New
Jersey was where the incident giving rise to the lawsuit occurred and it would
have allowed the injured plaintiff, an individual, to maintain his lawsuit in a
convenient forum.
In the final section of this Part, I provide a draft dissent by Justice Stevens. I
believe he certainly would have joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. I also believe
that he would have drafted a brief dissent summarizing the reasons for his
decision, as he did in Asahi, Burger King, and Burnham.192
C. A Draft of Justice Stevens’s Separate Dissent in McIntyre
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The respondent was injured in New Jersey while using a metal-shearing
machine manufactured by the petitioner, a British corporation that hired an Ohio
company to sell its products throughout the United States. The respondent filed
suit against petitioner in the State where his injury occurred, claiming that the
machine was a dangerous product defectively designed. In this case involving a
tort, there was “contact” between the respondent and the petitioner through the

2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). Stevens’s
dissent in McIntyre, therefore, would have followed from his vote in World-Wide Volkswagen.
189. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. See Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 587, 595, 597 (upholding a forum selection clause
requiring litigation in Florida where the clause was located on tickets issued by Carnival Cruise
Lines to customers in Washington state); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 463, 487 (citing FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 48.193(1)(g) (West 2006)) (upholding jurisdiction in Florida over a defendant based in
Michigan).
191. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 600–01, (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the
adhesive nature of a forum selection clause in a consumer contract and indicating it may be void as
against public policy); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 489–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The particular
distribution of bargaining power in the franchise relationship further impairs the franchisee’s
financial preparedness. . . . There is no indication that [the defendant] had any latitude to negotiate a
reduced rent or franchise fee in exchange for the added risk of suit in Florida.” (quoting Burger
King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1512–13 (11th Cir. 1984), rev’d and remanded sub rom.
Burger King , 471 U.S. 462) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
192. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 640 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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accident in which the respondent was injured. It was reasonable for the
respondent to bring suit in the State where he claims to have been injured by the
petitioner’s product. However, the Court has decided that the respondent may
not sue the petitioner in New Jersey, but must instead find another forum—
presumably Great Britain, where petitioner is incorporated. Ante, at 2791
(plurality opinion). This decision is neither supported by the law nor fair on the
facts.
JUSTICE KENNEDY’s plurality decision and JUSTICE BREYER’S
concurrence rest upon two facts with respect to “purposeful availment”: that the
the respondent’s employer purchased the machine from the petitioner’s exclusive
distributor in the United States, and that the petitioner sold no more than four of
its machines in New Jersey. Ante, at 2786 (plurality opinion); ante, at 2791–92
(BREYER, J., concurring). But these facts show that the petitioner purposefully
availed itself of the forum State. In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
I declined to make a constitutional determination with respect to “minimum
contacts.” See 480 U.S. 102, 121 (1987) (STEVENS, J., concurring). The Court
now must make such a determination, and I agree with JUSTICE GINSBURG
that the facts here establish that McIntyre UK purposefully availed itself of and
therefore had minimum contacts with New Jersey. See ante, at 2801, 2804
(GINSBURG, J., dissenting). Although the company had a small volume of
sales in the forum State—perhaps no more than one—it nevertheless employed a
distributor to sell its metal-shearing machines throughout the United States,
including the State of New Jersey. The machine that is alleged to have injured
the plaintiff sold for approximately $25,000. McIntyre UK had fair notice that
its efforts to sell such a large, potentially hazardous product in the United States
could lead to the company being sued in the State where the machine may have
injured someone. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring).
Neither World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), nor Asahi, relied on
by JUSTICE BREYER, support reversal of the judgment of the New Jersey
Supreme Court. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held that the regional
distributor and the seller of the car could not be sued in Oklahoma because they
did not attempt to sell cars or otherwise conduct business in that State. See
World-Wide Volkswagen, 448 U.S. at 298–99. Similarly, in Asahi, the defendant
challenging the exercise of jurisdiction was a component manufacturer and not
the manufacturer of the product—the motorcycle tire tube—that allegedly
malfunctioned. See Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1986). Here, McIntyre UK
controlled the efforts to sell its machines and made no attempt to structure the
efforts of its distributor to avoid sales into New Jersey. See World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[I]f the sale of a product . . . arises from the
efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the
market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in
one of those States . . . .”).
Finally, as JUSTICE GINSBURG explains, fairness concerns make it
eminently reasonable to permit the plaintiff to hale McIntyre UK into New
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Jersey. Ante, at 2801–02 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). To hold otherwise would
require the plaintiff, an individual, to assume the cost of traveling from where
the injury occurred to an inconvenient forum.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens prevented the Supreme Court from articulating a minimum
contacts rule for stream of commerce cases in Asahi, and his retirement
apparently prompted the Court to attempt to articulate such a rule in McIntyre.
What is most notable about the Court’s failure to agree on a rule for stream of
commerce jurisdiction in McIntyre is the even greater divergence between three
opinions in McIntyre compared to the different approaches in Asahi. In Asahi,
Justice O’Connor and Justice Brennan merely disagreed on the standard
necessary to establish minimum contacts in a stream of commerce case—and
Stevens refused to resolve that disagreement because of his belief that it was not
necessary to address the issue of minimum contacts.
McIntyre reveals a far more divided Court with respect to the issue of
specific jurisdiction. Justice Kennedy’s decision not only endorses the higher
“something more” standard articulated by O’Connor,193 it also embraces notions
of consent and state sovereignty believed to have been abandoned by the Court
after International Shoe.194 Justice Breyer’s concurrence amounts to an exercise
of what Professor Bickel described as the “passive virtues.” 195 However, in
deciding McIntyre as narrowly as possible in order to leave the issue of personal
jurisdiction for the next case, Breyer’s reading of World-Wide Volkswagen and
Asahi was myopic. Justice Ginsburg reached the correct result for the right
reasons in her dissent and would have received the vote of Stevens had he still
been on the Court. This would not, however, have changed the outcome, as only
two other Justices—including Stevens’s replacement, Justice Kagan—joined
Ginsburg’s dissent.
This Article has argued that with his common law approach to judging,
Justice Stevens would have dissented in McIntyre. It is worth noting that,
because the Court’s decision in McIntyre was splintered, the Court likely will be
asked to grant certiorari in another personal jurisdiction case in order to provide
more guidance in this area of the law. Were he still a Justice, Stevens would
decide the next case—the case after McIntyre—based upon its specific facts.

193. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788–89 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J.)).
194. See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Developments in the Law—
Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1333 n.98 (1983) (“Sixty
years later, however, the Court, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington abandoned the language of
territoriality and sovereignty . . . .” (citation omitted) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945))).
195. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111–98 (1962)
(discussing what he phrased “the passive virtues” and their relationship to jurisprudential
philosophy).
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Just as likely, surveying the path from Asahi to McIntyre, Stevens would vote to
deny certiorari in the case and allow the lower courts to develop their rules—as
they did during the more than two decades between Asahi and McIntyre.

